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Abuses of Section 527 Political
Organizations with More Speech, Not
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By JAMES H. ODDIE*
VIETNAM, 1968-A young United States Navy Lieutenant pilots a
swift boat1 through the hostile waterways of the Mekong Delta. One
day, while on patrol in the Bay Hap River, the craft comes under heavy
enemy fire. A Green Beret named James Rasmussen goes overboard.
The young Lieutenant, himself wounded, bleeding, and in a position
directly in the line of enemy fire, rescues his fellow serviceman. 2 Or
did he? That was the question raised by an obscure political organiza-
tion in the weeks following the former Navy Lieutenant's nomination
for President of the United States at the 2004 Democratic National
Convention.
The group questioning Senator John Kerry's Vietnam War ser-
vice, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth,3 was one of the many independent
political organizations that raised and spent millions of dollars during
* Class of 2007; M.B.A., Loyola University of Chicago (1991); B.S., Indiana
University (1986). Technical Editor, U.S.F. Law Review, Volume 40. Thank you to Jim
Sutton for inspiring this topic. Thank you to Professor John Adler for helping turn an op-
ed piece into a law review article and thank you to my editors, David Scopp andJess Booth,
for helping make that article publishable. Finally, thank you to Nak Min, Sarah, and
Linnea for supporting their husband/father in his journey through life.
1. Swift boats, officially named Patrol Crafts Fast or PCFs, operated in the shallow
waterways of Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. See, e.g., GlobalSecurity.org, Patrol
Craft Fast (PCF) Swift Boat, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/pcf.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2005). Crews of the fifty-one foot long boats inspected the papers and
cargos of civilian boats and carried combat troops in and out of hostile areas. Id.
2. See Michael Dobbs, Swift Boat Accounts Incomplete: Critics Fail to Disprove Kerry's Ver-
sion of Vietnam War Episode, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2004, at A01, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21239-2004Aug21.html; see alsoJohn Kerry in
Vietnam, http://www'johnkerry.com/about/ohn-kerry/service.html.
3. See Swift Vets and POWs for Truth, Home Page, http://www.swiftvets.com/ (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
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the 2004 election. 4 These organizations, known as § 527 political
groups-named for the section of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"
or "Code")5 that sanctions their existence-can run advertisements
and spend money as long as they do not advocate one candidate and
do not coordinate with political parties. 6 Democratic-oriented 527
groups, led by America Coming Together 7 and the Media Fund,8
raised over $321 million in their unsuccessful attempt to unseat Presi-
dent Bush in 2004,9 while Republican-oriented 527 political groups,
led by the Progress for America Voter Fund,10 raised $84 million in
their efforts to re-elect President Bush.' l Although out-raised and out-
spent by nearly four to one, the Republican-oriented organizations ap-
pear to have spent their money more wisely. Indeed, at a cost of only
$546,000 and airing only on four cable television channels, the Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth advertisement questioning John Kerry's mili-
tary service may well be the best remembered 527 group expenditure
4. See Steve Weissman & Ruth Hassan, BCRA and the 527 Groups, in THE ELECTION
AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT ch. 5, at 3
(Michael J. Malbin, ed., forthcoming Mar. 2006), http://www.campaignfinanceinstitute.
org/studies/ElectionAfterReform/pdf/EARChapter5_WeissmanHassan.pdf.
5. See I.R.C. § 527(a) (2000).
6. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). ("[T]he words political commit-
tee... need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the
major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate."). Section 527 orga-
nizations do not fall into this category, i.e., since they are not under candidate control and
have a major purpose independent of nominating or electing a candidate, they are not
political committees for the purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act. See Heather L.
Sidwell, Comment, Taming the Wild West: The fEC's Proposed Regulations to Bridle "527"Politi-
cal Groups, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 939, 946 (2004) ("In order to avoid overbreadth, the Su-
preme Court in Buckley v. Valeo construed the definition of political committee narrowly to
prevent incorporating groups engaged in purely 'issue discussion."').
7. See America Coming Together, Act 2.0 Building for the Future, http://ac-
there.com/plan (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (discussing the organization's primary purpose
of building a long-term progressive grassroots infrastructure). This organization an-
nounced in August 2005 that it was ceasing operations. See Glen Justice, Democratic Fund-
Raiser Unit Is Curtailing Most Operations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A14.
8. The Media Fund was established November 5, 2003 to "communicate with the
public on issues that relate to the election of candidates for federal, state or local office or
the legislative process in a manner that does not expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a particular candidate." The Media Fund, Political Organization Notice of Section 527
Status, Form 8871 (filed with the Internal Revenue Service November 6, 2003), available at
http://forms.irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/Print.action?formld=10700&formType=
E71 (last accessed Sept. 19, 2005).
9. See Weissman & Hassan, supra note 4, at 3.
10. See Progress for America Voter Fund, Home Page, http://www.pfavoterfund.com/





of the 2004 election. 12 The advertisement was strategically aired at
precisely the right time to crush Senator Kerry's post-convention
momentum. 1
3
Within weeks of the swift boat advertisement controversy, propo-
nents of campaign finance reform introduced legislation in Congress
intended to regulate these § 527 political groups. 14 Proponents of the
proposed legislation contended that these groups should be subject to
the same rules as other political action committees. Proponents fur-
ther argued that § 527 groups have flourished in large part because
they are not limited by the restrictions that the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 200215 ("BCRA") imposes on other political action
committees. 16 Thus, the proposed legislation attempted to close what
some perceived as a loophole in the BCRA.17 Although § 527 reform
failed to advance in the 108th Congress, proponents introduced the
527 Reform Act of 200518 in the 109th Congress.
Even though the 2004 election is history, the impact of 527
groups continues in 2005. One major publication reported a media
12. See Thomas B. Edsall & James V. Grimaldi, On Nov. 2, GOP Got More Bang for Its
Billion, Analysis Shows, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2004, at Al, A7.
13. See Rasmussen Reports, Presidential Tracking Poll: Bush-Kerry, http://
www.rasmussenreports.com/Weekly%20Tracking%20Updates.htm. Senator Kerry enjoyed
a modest 2.0% lead in the July 29 Rasmussen weekly tracking poll taken immediately fol-
lowing the Democratic convention. Id. The lead expanded to 2.8% in the August 12 Ras-
mussen tracking poll. Id. The August 26 Rasmussen tracking poll, taken after two weeks of
publicity for the Swift Boat advertisements, showed President Bush with a narrow 0.3%
lead, which he expanded to 2.8% following the Republican convention the following week.
Id. President Bush never relinquished the lead in the Rasmussen poll. Id. Bush bested
Senator Kerry by 2.4% in the general election, 50.7% to 48.3%. See, e.g., Dave Leip's Atlas
of U.S. Presidential Elections, 2004 Presidential Election Results, http://
www.uselectionatlas.org/ (follow "2004" hyperlink; then follow "National Results" hyper-
link) (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
14. See 150 CONG. REc. S9527 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(introducing the 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 2828, 108th Cong. (2004)).
15. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 81 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C.).
16. See 151 CONG. Rac. S973 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
17. See id. ("The soft money loophole was opened by FEC rulings in the late '70s. By
the time we started work on the BCRA, the problem had mushroomed .... When we
passed BCRA, I said we would have to be vigilant to make sure that the FEC enforced the
law and that similar loopholes did not develop. That is what we have been doing for the
past three years, and what are again doing today."); 150 CONG. REC. S576, S577 (daily ed.
Feb. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("After the success of McConnell v. FEC, we can-
not sit idly by and allow this potentially massive circumvention of campaign finance laws.
BCRA finally closed soft money loopholes, and .. . new ones should not and cannot be
tolerated.").
18. S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); see also 151 CONG. REc.
S973 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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group study noting $70 million in political advertisement spending in
the first half of the year alone. 19 As § 527 groups increase their spend-
ing and advocacy, pressure will mount on Congress to regulate them
before the 2006 election cycle begins in earnest.
This Comment contends that attempts to regulate § 527 organiza-
tions, primarily by imposing contribution limits, infringe on the basic
First Amendment freedoms of speech, expression, and association.
While preventing corruption, or even the appearance of it, has been
held to be a compelling enough interest to limit political contribu-
tions in Buckley v. Valeo2° and McConnell v. FEC,21 corruption concerns
in relation to § 527 organizations do not rise to the levels faced in
those cases. The requirement that § 527 organizations operate inde-
pendently of candidates and political parties, without coordinating ac-
tivities, diminishes the opportunity for corruption. Furthermore, fears
of actual corruption, or even the appearance of corruption, are signif-
icantly reduced when an individual or advocacy group makes an inde-
pendent expenditure rather than a direct contribution to a political
candidate. Finally, the activity of § 527 political groups further
removes political parties and corporate interests from the equation
and brings political speech closer to the people. Even assuming, argu-
endo, that corruption concerns proved to be compelling enough, this
reform legislation would not adequately prevent it because its pro-
posed disclosure requirements duplicate those already in place today.
The most likely result of imposing contribution limits is less political
speech. The better alternative to additional regulation is to encourage
advocacy groups to fight objectionable political speech with more po-
litical speech.
Part I of this Comment describes § 527 political groups and their
place in the American campaign finance apparatus. Drawing a distinc-
tion between 527 groups and political committees regulated by the
Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), this Part also describes the cur-
19. Matthew Swibel, Airing It Out, FoRBES, July 25, 2005, at 62 (citing study by TN-
SMedia Intelligence-CMAG reporting a variety of spending including: $8.3 million on so-
cial security, $4.5 million on tort reform, $4.4 on the battle over judicial nomination
filibusters, $1.5 million on the nomination of Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, and
$75,000 on the nomination ofJohn Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations). Spend-
ing estimates for the November 2005 California Special Election exceed $50 million and
one conservative group anticipates spending $18 million in an effort to ensure confirma-
tion of President Bush's nominee to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding limits placed on contributions to presidential and
congressional candidates imposed by Congress after the 1972 elections).
21. 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding the prohibition of soft money contributions to
national political parties). See infra note 61 (defining soft money).
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rent regulatory structure under which § 527 political groups operate
today and how they fit into the overall structure of America's cam-
paign finance system.
Part II of this Comment discusses the 527 Reform Act of 2005,
legislation introduced in Congress to regulate § 527 political groups
as political committees, subject to the jurisdiction of the FEC. This
proposed legislation also imposes restrictions on the types of funds
organizations can use for voter mobilization or public communica-
tions as well as limiting contributions to $25,000 per donor, per year
for a § 527 political organization.
Part III of this Comment examines the key holding of Buckley that
spending money is a form of political speech 22 and explores why the
United States Supreme Court upheld the BCRA's ban on soft money
in McConnell.23 The Buckley holding underlies all campaign finance
regulation enacted over the last three decades. 24 Moreover, to justify
campaign finance reform legislation in both Buckley and McConnell,
the Supreme Court spoke of the government's interest in preventing
corruption or even avoiding the appearance of corruption. This inter-
est in reducing corruption loses merit as political speech moves fur-
ther away from the candidates and political parties and closer to the
citizenry through their political associations, such as § 527 organiza-
tions.2 5 Finally, bringing § 527 groups under the FEC disclosure um-
22. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-23 (1976).
23. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 224 ("In the main we uphold BCRA's two principal,
complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering
communications.").
24. See generally McConnell 540 U.S. 93; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 249 (1986); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1; FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 53 (D.D.C.
1999).
25. The regulation and political activities of organizations organized under § 501 (c)
of the IRC are not in the scope of this Comment and are not the target of the 527 Reform
Act of 2005. See 151 CONG. REC. S973 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(stating that nothing in the 527 Reform Act of 2005 "will affect legitimate 501 (c) advocacy
groups"); S. 271, 109th Cong. § 4(3) (2005); see also Regulation of Sec. 527 Political Interest
Organizations: Hearing on S. 271 Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Administration, 109th Cong.
5 (2005) (statement of Frances R. Hill, Professor, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law), http://
rules.senate.gov/hearings/2005/HillTestimony.pdf (noting that neither section 501 (c) (3)
nor 501 (c) (4) organizations are "organized for the primary purpose of influencing the
outcome of elections"). But see Regulation of Sec. 527 Political Interest Organizations: Hearing on
S. 271 Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Administration, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) (statement of
Robert F. Bauer, Chair, Political Law Group), http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2005/
BauerTestimony.pdf (noting that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was just
"one stage in a multi-stage program of regulating money in politics" and that proposed
legislation regulating 527 political groups "is the next phase . . . [and] is certain not to be
the last"). Mr. Bauer also noted that
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brella is not necessary given the disclosure requirements already
placed upon them by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
Part IV of this Comment purports that if the true goal of the 527
Reform Act is merely to limit unpopular speech, a better alternative to
the 527 Reform Act is to fight offensive speech with more political
speech. No amount of disclosure, contribution limits, or other regula-
tions would have effectively rebutted the charges made in the Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth advertisement. Only more political speech
could have blunted the advertisement's effectiveness and challenged
its truthfulness.
I. Regulation of Political Groups Under Section 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code
A. Section 527 Organizations Defined
Section 527 of the IRC exempts political organizations from fed-
eral income taxes. 26 Congress enacted § 527 in 1975 specifically to ex-
empt contributions to political organizations and candidates from
federal income tax.2 7 The IRC defines a political organization as any
"association, fund, or other organization.., organized and operated
primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contribu-
tions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function."28
The Code further defines exempt functions as "influencing or at-
tempting to influence the selection, nomination, [or] election ... of
any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office .... "29
[b]y empowering the FEC to determine whether an organization is an IRC § 527
"political organization," the bill would surely encourage complaints to the FEC
that various organizations, particularly 501 (c)s, were operating as 527s, not as
501 (c)s. In light of the reform community's distrust of 501 (c) advocacy and voter
mobilization programs, this is not by any means a remote possibility.
Id. at 8; PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH, THE NEW STEALTH PACs: TRACKING 501 (c)
NON-PROFIT GROUPS AcrvE IN ELECTRiONS 5-7 (2004), available at http://www.stealthpacs.
org/documents/mainreport.pdf (calling for the IRS, FEC, and Congress to improve disclo-
sure of 501(c) organizations' election activities); Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for Non-Profit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. Ky. L. REV.
243, 287 (2004) (calling for enhancing the disclosure requirements for 501(c)
organizations).
26. See I.R.C. § 527(a) (2000).
27. Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir.
2003); see also David D. Storey, Comment, The Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating Stealth
PACs and Providing a Model for Future Campaign Finance Reform, 77 IND. L.J. 167, 176 (2002)
(noting that donations to section 527 political organizations are exempt from the gift tax).
28. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
29. Id. § 527(e) (2).
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Thus, any organization whose primary purpose is to raise and
spend money in order to influence an election qualifies as a valid po-
litical organization under § 527 and is entitled to tax-exempt status. 30
This includes political parties, as well as federal, state, and local politi-
cal action committees and candidate committees. 3 ' Some § 527
groups, however, like Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, can avoid having
to comply with the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA")3 2
as well as regulation by the FEC.3 3 Thus, it is not the tax laws that
apply to these particular § 527 organizations that are important, but
the campaign finance laws that do not apply to them that are the most
significant. 34
B. Avoiding Regulation by the FEC
The FEC defines a "political committee" as one that makes contri-
butions and expenditures for the purpose of influencing elections.
35
Under FECA, political committees must register with the FEC, adhere
to strict disclosure requirements, and comply with contribution and
30. See id. § 527(c) (3); see also Storey, supra note 27, at 175.
31. See I.R.C. § 527(e). A hypothetical federal candidate committee might be "Jane
Doe for United States Senate," while a hypothetical local committee might be "Susan Smith
for Mayor." Senator Barbara Boxer's "PAC for a Change" is an example of a federal politi-
cal action committee.
32. See generally Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. (86 Stat.) 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2000)).
33. Any political organization operating under § 527 must register with the IRS. I.R.C.
§ 527(i) (2000). One exception to this requirement exists for an organization that does
not reasonably anticipate $25,000 or more in gross receipts during a taxable year. Id.
§ 527(i) (5) (B) (allowing small political organizations to function without burdening them
with disclosure and reporting requirements). A second exception exempts state or local
candidate committees as well as state and local party committees from the registration
requirement. Id. § 527(i) (5) (C) (granting these committees, such as the Texas Republican
Party or the Alameda County Democratic Central Committee, tax-exempt status without
the need for registration with the IRS). An organization falling under § 527 must disclose
its expenditures and contributions to the IRS. See generally id. § 527(j). Exceptions to the
disclosure requirements apply to state and local candidate committees, state and local
party committees, qualified state or local political organizations, and organizations that do
not reasonably anticipate gross receipts of $25,000 or more during any taxable year. Id.
§ 5270) (5) (B)-(D). A "qualified State or local political organization" is a political organi-
zation that influences, or attempts to influence, only state or local elections and is subject
to state laws requiring disclosure of expenditures and contributions. Id. § 527(e) (5) (A). In
short, a political organization that uses dues, contributions, or fund-raising proceeds for
the purpose of influencing elections can treat those sources of income as tax-exempt. See
id. § 527(c) (3).
34. Michael C. Dorf, Why "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" and Other "527" Organizations
Can't Be Silenced, FINDLw's LEGAL COMMENT., Sept. 1, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20040901.html.
35. ROBERT F. BAUER, MORE SoFr MONEY HARD LAw 58-59 (2004).
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expenditure limits.3 6 Buckley noted that "the words 'political commit-
tee' . . . need only encompass organizations that are under the control
of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate."3 7 Currently, an organization falls under
§ 527 provisions, rather than FECA, if it does not fall within that defi-
nition.38 These § 527 organizations are not subject to the contribution
limits set forth in FECA.39 Nor are these 527 groups subject to FEC
contribution and expenditure reporting requirements that political
committees are subject to, although the larger ones must disclose con-
tributions and expenditures to the IRS.40
As originally enacted, § 527 did not contain any disclosure re-
quirements because it was believed that tax-exempt political organiza-
tions were covered under the FECA disclosure rules.41 One year after
the enactment of § 527, however, Buckley v. Valeo42 "effectively elimi-
nated disclosure requirements for anything other than express advo-
cacy."43 Thus, in order for § 527 organizations to avoid FEC
regulation, they must keep in mind the magic words of Buckley and
avoid "expressly advocating" the election or defeat of a federal candi-
date.44 For example, organizations may send out a voter guide con-
36. Id. at 59.
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
38. See discussion supra note 6 and accompanying text.
39. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2000) (dollar limits on contributions).
40. See infra Part III.D. Organizations that reasonably expect annual gross receipts in
excess of $25,000 must comply with the disclosure requirements. I.R.C.
§ 527(j)(5) (B)-(D).
41. See Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (11th
Cir. 2003). In Mobile Republican Assembly, the court quoted the following statement made by
Senator Carl Levin in 2000:
Congress ... assumed that [section 527] ... organizations would be filing with
the FEC under the campaign finance laws for the obvious reason that the lan-
guage for both coverage by the IRS and coverage by the FEC were the same-
"influencing an election." . .. [I]t was assumed that section 527 didn't need to
require disclosure with the IRS, since the FEC disclosure was considerably more
complete.
Id. at 1359 n. 1 (internal citation omitted).
42. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
43. Mobile Republican Assembly, 353 F.3d at 1360. In Mobile Republican Assembly, the Elev-
enth Circuit court interpreted Buckley as holding that under FECA, "expenditures" only
included "'express advocacy' that explicitly called for the election or defeat of a particular
candidate within a specific election." Id. at 1359-60. See also infra Part III.A.1 (discussing
Buckley).
44. The Code of Federal Regulations defines express advocacy as any communications
urging the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2005).
Clearly identified is defined as "the candidate's name, nickname, photograph, or drawing
... [or if] the identity of the candidate is otherwise apparent through an unambiguous
reference .. .or through an unambiguous reference to his or her status as a candi-
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taining candidates' voting records and their pictures. 45 This would be
perfectly valid under § 527 as long as the organization never expressly
advocates the election or defeat of one of the candidates. 46
II. The 527 Reform Act of 2005 Aims to Regulate 527
Political Organizations
A. Failure of the FEC to Adopt Proposed Regulations Regulating
Section 527 Political Groups in Advance of the 2004
Election
The FEC published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on March
11, 2004, which proposed to regulate § 527 political groups as "politi-
cal committees." 47 Included in these proposed regulations were nu-
merous proposals and questions surrounding regulating § 527
political groups. Proponents of additional regulation argued that the
integrity of the political process was at stake and that § 527 political
groups should be subject to the same strict reporting, contribution
limits, and source prohibitions as political committees.48 Conversely,
opponents of the proposed regulations contended that the allegations
of circumventing the law were greatly exaggerated. 49 The FEC voted
on May 13, 2004 to postpone consideration of the proposed rules for
at least ninety days, 50 thus ensuring that no new restrictions on § 527
political groups would be in place for the 2004 general election.51
date .... " 11 C.F.R. § 100.17. See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) ("[T]he
use or omission of 'magic words' such as 'Elect John Smith' or 'Vote Against Jane Doe'
marked a bright statutory line separating 'express advocacy' from 'issue advocacy.'").
45. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c) (5) (2005). A corporation or labor union producing a
voter guide:
[M]ust not act in cooperation, consultation, or concert with or at the request or
suggestion of the candidates, the candidates' committees or agents regarding the
preparation, contents and distribution of the voter guide, and no portion of the
voter guide may expressly advocate the election or defeat of one or more clearly
identified candidate(s) or candidates of any clearly identified political party.
Id. § 114.4(c)(5) (i).
46. Storey, supra note 27, at 175-76.
47. See Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004). The
FEC considered whether "it should revise current regulations to reflect that certain com-
munications and certain voter drive activities have the purpose of influencing federal elec-
tions." Id. at 11,738.
48. See Sidwell, supra note 6, at 950.
49. See id. at 950-51.
50. Julia Malone, Election 2004: FEC Rejects New 'Soft Money' Limits, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., May 14, 2004, at A3.
51. Id. The FEC eventually considered the rules; however, it adopted only regulations
affecting solicitation and the allocation of expenses. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.57 (2005) (solicita-
tion); 11 C.F.R. § 106.6 (allocation).
Fall 2005] SPEECH WITH SPEECH
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
B. Introduction of the 527 Reform Act
The failure of the FEC to regulate § 527 political groups as politi-
cal committees, and the controversy generated by the Swift Boat Vet-
erans for Truth, prompted Senator John McCain and Representative
Christopher Shays, believing that § 527 organizations were engaging
in illegal activities, to introduce legislation in Congress to achieve the
same goal. 52 McCain's bill, the 527 Reform Act of 2005 ("527 Reform
Act") ,5 would require all § 527 political groups to "register as political
committees with the FEC and comply with federal campaign finance
laws unless they are involved in non-federal election activities."54 Sena-
tor McCain's proposed legislation seeks to accomplish three things.
First, it seeks to bring § 527 political groups under the umbrella of
FECA, subjecting them to federal campaign finance laws and regula-
tion by the FEC.5 5 Second, it seeks to establish new rules for political
committees that make expenditures on activities in both federal and
non-federal races.5 6 Finally, it seeks to limit contributions to the non-
federal account (which can include the soft money traditionally raised
52. See 150 CONG. REC. S9527 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(introducing the 527 Reform Act of 2004 (S. 2828) claiming that 527 political groups were
illegally spending soft money in an attempt to influence Federal elections-S. 2828 was not
acted on by the 108th Congress).
53. S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005), H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005). S. 271 was amended by
the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and reported to the Senate as S. 1053.
151 CONG. REc. S5296 (daily ed. May 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lott) (reporting S.
1053). The most significant amendments increase the contribution limits for political ac-
tion committees from $5000 to $7000, S. 1053, 109th Cong. § 6(a)-(c) (2005), prevent the
FEC from regulating political activity on the Internet, id. § 5, and exempt voter drive activ-
ity by § 527 organizations, both partisan and non-partisan, from FEC regulation, id. § 2(b).
See also Common Cause, 527 Groups, http://www.commoncause.org (follow "'527' Re-
form" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (noting that the "reform community does not
support the amended version of S. 271").
54. 151 CONG. Rac. S973 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (intro-
ducing S. 271). Sen. McCain originally introduced this legislation in the 108th Congress,
but Congress did not act on it, and he and Sen. Feingold reintroduced it in the 109th
Congress. See also 527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005) (containing lan-
guage identical to S. 271). This companion legislation was introduced on February 2, 2005
in the House of Representatives by Rep. Christopher Shays. H.R. 513 was not amended by
the House Administration Committee and thus remains identical to S. 271. See H.R. REP.
No. 109-181, at 1-6 (2005); Common Cause, supra note 53.
An alternative bill, the 527 Fairness Act of 2005, calls for no additional regulation of
527 groups and seeks to level the playing field by removing contribution limits on individu-
als and certain expenditure limits on political parties. See generally 527 Fairness Act of 2005,
H.R. 1316, 109th Cong. (2005). While the 527 Fairness Act of 2005 desires a result similar
to the one advocated in this Comment, this legislation is not within the scope of this
Comment.
55. See 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
56. S. 271 § 3.
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from unions or corporations) of § 527 political organizations to
$25,000 per year per donor.57
1. Bringing 527 Political Groups Under FECA
The proposed legislation adds "any applicable 527 organization"
under the definition of political committee defined in FECA.58 An ap-
plicable 527 organization under the 527 Reform Act is broadly de-
fined as any organization "described in § 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code" that is not exclusively engaged in non-federal election activity. 59
The effect of this designation would require § 527 political groups en-
gaged in federal election activity to register with the FEC as political
committees.60 This would restrict their funding of expenditures to
federal hard money contributions, even those expenditures that do
not engage in express advocacy. 61 Ultimately, this legislation prohibits
§ 527 political groups from raising and spending soft money for any
federal election activity.62
2. Extending Allocation Rules to 527 Political Groups
These proposed rules also require that at least half of funds ex-
pended on voter mobilization or public communications be from the
organization's federal account (composed of hard money-tradition-
ally raised from individuals) 63 This "at least 50% rule" impacts both
political committees regulated by the FEC today as well as § 527
groups that would fall under the FEC umbrella should the legislation
57. Id.
58. S. 271 § 2 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)).
59. Id. (describing non-federal activities as those in connection with (1) non-federal
candidate elections, (2) state and local ballot initiatives, referenda, constitutional amend-
ments, bond issues, or ballot issues, or (3) the nomination, selection, confirmation, or
appointment of non-elected offices, such as judges).
60. Political organizations that have gross receipts less than $25,000 are exempt from
the registration requirements of I.R.C. § 527(i), as well as the provisions of the 527 Reform
Act requiring registration with the FEC and compliance with federal campaign finance
laws. See 151 CONG. REc. S973 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold). See also
I.R.C. § 527(i) (5) (b) (2004).
61. Contributions intended for use in federal elections that are subject to FECA's
disclosure requirements, source limitations, and amount limitations are known as "federal"
or "hard" money contributions. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 98, 122 (2003); EMILY's List v.
FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46 n.1 (D.D.C. 2005) (mem.). "Nonfederal funds are also re-
ferred to as 'soft money,' which consists of funds that are raised outside of the source and
amount limitations imposed by FECA. and are not intended for use in conjunction with
federal elections." Id. at 46 n.2.
62. 151 CONG. Rac. S973 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
63. S. 271 § 3.
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be adopted. 64 In addition, the new rules would require organizations
to pay 100% of voter mobilization or public communication expendi-
tures from federal (hard money) funds when referring solely to fed-
eral candidates. 65
The proposed rules also significantly increase the amount of hard
money that must be used in other circumstances. The "at least 50%
rule" would apply to voter mobilization and public communications
that refer to (1) one or more federal candidates in combination with
one or more non-federal candidates, (2) a political party, even if no
references to federal or non-federal candidates, and (3) a political
party and only clearly identified non-federal candidates, even in the
absence of a clearly identified federal candidate. 66 Finally, the 527 Re-
form Act extends the application of the controversial allocation rules
the FEC adopted in late 2004, requiring allocation of at least 50% of
administrative expenditures67 to a political action committee's
("PAC's") 68 federal account, to 527 political groups as well. 69
64. Id. § 3(a). This section amends FECA, thus subjecting all political committees reg-
ulated by the FEC to its provisions. Id. Under this bill, § 527 organizations would also fall
under FECA's jurisdiction, thus subjecting these organizations to these rules as well. Id. § 2.
65. Id. § 3 ("100 percent of the expenses for public communications or voter drive
activities that refer to one or more clearly identified Federal candidates, but do not refer to
any clearly identified non-Federal candidates, shall be paid with funds from a Federal ac-
count, with regard to whether the communication refers to a political party.").
66. Id.
67. Administrative expenses include office supplies, utilities, rent, and salaries for in-
dividuals "not attributable to a clearly identified candidate." 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(b)(1)(i)
(2005).
68. A PAC being defined as a "segregated fund that a corporation, labor union, or
political organization can create to collect voluntary contributions from individuals-but
not corporate funds-and pass them on to candidates." E. JOSHuA ROSENKRANZ, BuCKLEr
STOPS HERE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURy FUND/WORKING GROUP ON CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE LITIGATION 24-25 (1998). Prior to 1974, the lack of individual contribution
limits to political candidates decreased the incentive to contribute to a political action
committee. After the 1974 amendments to the FECA, candidate contribution limits and
higher allowable donations to PACs made them an increasingly attractive vehicle for cam-
paign funds. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Elec-
tion, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2095-96 (1984) (reviewing HERBERT E. ALEXANDER,
FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION (1983) and ELIZABETH DREw, POLITICS AND MONEY (1983)).
69. S. 271 § 3. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.57, 106.6 (2005); see also Glen Justice, National
Briefing Washington: Group Sues over Campaign Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 12, 2005, at A18
(reporting that EMILY's List, a Democratic-leaning PAC, filed suit to block the implemen-
tation of new allocation rules codified in 11 C.F.R. § 106.6 (2005)). See Plaintiffs Applica-
tion for a Preliminary Injunction, EMILY's List v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2005)
(No. 05-49(CKK)). Judge Kollar-Kotelly denied the request for a preliminary injunction on
grounds that EMILY's List was unlikely to prevail on the merits of their case. EMILY's List,
362 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
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From 1991 through the enactment of the BCRA, political parties
functioned under allocation rules similar to those § 527 organizations
function under today.70 Unions and corporations were allowed to con-
tribute soft money to political parties that they could partially use for
voter registration and voter mobilization activities to influence federal
elections.71 Congress altered the allocation rules for party committees
with the BCRA by preventing national party committees from raising
or spending any soft money on generic voter mobilization activities
and severely restricted the ability of state party committees to do so. 72
Supporters of the 527 Reform Act complain that after the BCRA, un-
ions now contribute union dues to § 527 organizations they control
that in turn, fund voter registration and voter mobilization efforts
aimed at influencing federal elections. 73 Since unions are generally
prohibited from making contributions and expenditures in federal
elections,74 supporters allege that this flow of union money to § 527
organizations circumvents campaign finance laws.
7 5
3. Limiting Contributions to 527 Political Groups
Today, an individual can give an unlimited amount to 527 politi-
cal groups-witness billionaire George Soros's total contributions of
$24 million in the 2004 election cycle. 76 Under the 527 Reform Act,
contributions would be limited to $25,000 per year.77 This limit ap-
plies to a committee's federal election activity and non-federal activ-
ity.7 8 This would severely restrict the amount of money a § 527
organization can raise to finance voter mobilization activities and elec-
70. EMILY's List, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
71. Id.
72. Id. State party committees are permitted to fund generic voter mobilization activi-
ties with an allocation of federal funds and "limited, regulated nonfederal funds." Id. (cit-
ing 4 U.S.C.A. § 441i(b) (2) (West 2005)). These limited, regulated nonfederal funds are
also known as Levin funds. See C.F.R. § 300.31 (2005) (defining Levin funds).
73. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, QUESTIONS AND ANswERS CONCERNING S. 271, THE 527
REFORM ACT OF 2005, at 2 (2005), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/
1360.pdf.
74. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 116-17 (2003) (discussing the history of Con-
gress's attempts to limit the influence of unions on federal elections).
75. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, supra note 73, at 2.
76. Weissman & Hassan, supra note 4, at 14 (summarizing contributions of 527 do-
nors from information disclosed to the IRS).
77. 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); see also 150 CONG. REC.
S9527 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("To put it in simple terms, a
George Soros could give $25,000 per year as opposed to $10 million .... ").
78. See S. 271 § 3. The 527 Reform Act also treats "committees which are directly or
indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by the same person or per-
sons ... as one account." Id.
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tioneering communications for use in both federal and non-federal
elections.
The swift boat group registered with the IRS in April, 2004.79
Their first public exposure was in early August. 0 At that time, the
group had raised $850,000-$700,000 of this amount coming from
only two donors.8 1 FEC Commissioner David Mason testified that had
the proposed contribution limits been in place at the time, they "very
likely would have effectively muzzled this group."8 2 Considering the
uproar over the content of the swift boat advertisement and the tim-
ing of the proposed legislation, a strong case can be made that the
legislation's intent is to regulate this group's message. 83
II. Corruption Concerns Surrounding Section 527 Political
Groups Do Not Rise to the Levels Faced in Buckley
and McConnell
A. Political Speech Forms the Foundation of the First Amendment
1. Buckley v. Valeo Protects Political Spending as Speech
Political speech forms one of the core freedoms protected by the
First Amendment.84 The Supreme Court recognized this in Mills v.
Alabama,85 declaring that:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs. This of course includes discussion of candi-
dates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which
79. Regulation of Sec. 527 Political Interest Organizations: Hearing on S. 271 Before the S.
Comm. on Rules and Administration, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of David M. Mason,
Commissioner, Federal Election Commission), http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2005/
MasonTestimony.pdf [hereinafter Mason Statement].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. ("[I]t is a very real possibility that the Swift Boat group might never have got-
ten off the ground with a paid media effort had it had to rely on individual donations of no
more than $5,000. As it was, the group took three months to raise the seed money, less
than $50,000 of which was permissible for a Federal political committee, for its initial me-
dia buy.").
83. If Congress is found to be regulating the content of speech, then the regulation is
subject to strict scrutiny. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPALS AND POLI-
CIES § 11.2.1 at 904 (2d ed. 2002). A strict scrutiny analysis is not in the scope of this
Comment. See also infra note 113 and accompanying text.
84. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, § 11.3.6.3 at 1032-33 ("If there is a hierarchy of pro-
tected speech, political speech occupies the top rung.").
85. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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government is operated or should be operated, and all such mat-
ters relating to political processes. 86
Ten years later, the Court applied this holding to political contri-
butions and spending in the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo.87james
L. Buckley, then a United States Senator, and a number of political
candidates challenged the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments
made to FECA ("1974 Act"). 88 Congress amended FECA in 1974 in
response to the Watergate scandal. 89 At the time, these amendments
to FECA were viewed as "the most comprehensive reform legislation
[ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President,
Vice-President, and members of Congress."90
The 1974 Act established contribution limits of $1,000 to any sin-
gle candidate per election (and an overall contribution limit of
$25,000 for any one contributor).91 Congress also limited indepen-
dent expenditures by groups and individuals on behalf of a clearly
identified candidate to $1,000 per year and imposed spending limits
on various federal candidates as well as political parties' spending on
their national conventions. 92 It also required the reporting and disclo-
sure of contributions and expenditures over certain thresholds. 93
PACs, which were virtually unheard of until after FECA, were allowed
to contribute $5,000 per election.94 Finally, the 1974 Act created the
86. Id. at 218-19; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, § 11.3.6.3, at 1033.
87. 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
88. Id. at 6-8.
89. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat.) 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 and I.R.C.
§§ 9001-9042). President Nixon received 142 contributions in excess of $50,000 in his
1972 re-election bid, including $2 million from W. Clement Stone. ROSENKRANZ, supra note
68, at 23. Nixon also received $750,000 in illegal donations from twelve corporations. Id.
Nixon's secretary Rosemary Woods kept a secret list of Nixon's largest contributors. Id. The
chairman of a corporation owning an oil refinery under investigation by the Interior De-
partment secretly contributed over $200,000 to the presidential campaigns of both Nixon
and Democratic Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman of the Senate Interior Committee at
the time. Id. Contributions to congressional candidates were similarly excessive with thirty-
five contributors providing $1.4 million. Id.
90. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (alteration in original) (internal citation
omitted).
91. Id. See also ROSENKRANZ, supra note 68, at 25 (noting that contributions to all fed-
eral candidates, national parties, and PACs were aggregated in determining the $25,000
cap). Contributions to the national committees of the political parties were capped at
$20,000 per year for individuals and $15,000 for PACs. Id.
92. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
93. Id.
94. ROSENKRANZ, supra note 68, at 24; see also discussion supra note 68 (defining PAC).
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system of public funding for presidential elections (via a check box on
individual income tax returns) and established the FEC.95
The Court upheld all the provisions of the 1974 Act except for
the expenditure limits. 96 While both contribution and expenditure
limits involved fundamental First Amendment rights, the Court found
that the expenditure limits were a much more significant imposition
on those rights. 97 The Court also rejected the government's argument
of an interest in "equalizing the relative ability .. to influence the
outcome of elections."98 The idea that limiting campaign spending by
a wealthier group to enhance the speech of a less financially capable
group was found to be "wholly foreign to the First Amendment."99
The legacy of Buckley, that "political spending is equivalent to
speech and [is] therefore protected by the First Amendment,"' 00 has
shaped the landscape of campaign finance debate for the last quarter-
century.' 0 ' The Court's distinction between expenditures and contri-
butions, and its analysis of issue advocacy versus express advocacy,
form the underpinnings of the campaign finance regulatory system in
place today. 10 2 Buckley led to a virtual explosion in the growth of politi-
cal action committees.103 Soft money contributions, in the form of do-
nations from unions, corporations, and wealthy individuals who
exceeded their maximum permissible federal contribution limits,
soared-as did the clamor for increased regulation of these contribu-
95. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id.
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48.
99. Id. at 48-49.
100. Storey, supra note 27, at 170; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, § 11.3.6.3, at
1034.
101. See Storey, supra note 27, at 170.
102. See id. Issue advocacy came to prominence during the debate over then-First Lady
Hillary Clinton's health care proposal. The memorable "Harry and Louise" television ad-
vertisements were the first significant issue advertisements and had a profound impact on
the eventual demise of Mrs. Clinton's plan. See Swibel, supra note 19, at 62. The Health
Insurance Association of America ran advertisements criticizing the Clinton healthcare
plan. Ryan Ellis, Comment, "Electioneering Communication" Under the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002: A Constituional Reclassiflcation of "Express Advocacy," 54 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
187, 194 (2003). The advertisements featured a fictitious couple named Harry and Louise
lamenting about the plan's effect on them. Id. These advertisements were targeted at mem-
bers of the congressional committee responsible for considering the plan and encouraged
citizens to contact their representatives. Id.
103. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, McConnell v. FEC, Corporate Political Speech, and the Legacy
of the Segregated Fund Cases, 3 ELEcrION L. J. 361, 365 (2004) (reporting the growth of corpo-




tions.10 4 This clamor energized reform efforts that culminated with
the passage of the BCRA in 2002.105
2. McConnell v. FEC and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002
The BCRA aimed to curb the expansive growth of political action
committees by attempting to reduce the influence of soft money in
federal elections. 10 6 The BCRA accomplished this in a number of
ways, beginning with the prohibition of soft money contributions to
political parties.'0 7 It supported this prohibition with a number of pro-
visions designed to prevent the national parties from creatively cir-
cumventing the soft money ban.10 8 The BCRA also prohibited the use
of soft money to sponsor broadcast advertisements within sixty days of
a general election.' 0 9
Senator Mitch McConnell, along with a number of interest
groups, challenged the BCRA in court. The Supreme Court, however,
upheld many key provisions of the Act in McConnell v. FEC.110 The
Court subjected the soft money ban to less rigorous scrutiny than the
strict scrutiny applied to the expenditure limits in Buckley.11 Although
the Court detailed their recent history of applying this "less rigorous
scrutiny" standard,11 2 it also cited Buckley in noting that contribution
104. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123-24 (2003); see also discussion supra
note 61 (defining soft money).
105. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(116 Stat.) 81 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
106. See 150 Cong. Rec. S576, (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain) (not-
ing that he and Sen. Feingold introduced the BCRA "to limit the influence of special inter-
ests on Federal campaigns"); see also Joshua Downie, Note, McConnell v. FEC: Supporting
Congress and Congress's Attempt at Campaign Finance Reform, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 927 (2004).
107. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a) (West 2004).
108. Downie, supra note 106, at 929 (noting that the BCRA prohibits (1) state and local
parties from using soft money for federal election activities, (2) political parties from using
tax-exempt organizations, i.e., 527 organizations, engaging in electioneering activities as a
conduit for soft money, (3) federal candidates and officeholders from raising and spend-
ing soft money, as well as limiting their involvement in doing so in state and local elections,
and (4) non-federal candidates from soliciting and spending soft money on public commu-
nications promoting or attacking federal candidates).
109. See Sidwell, supra note 6, at 943 n.22.
110. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding the soft money ban and electioneering com-
munications regulation provisions); id. at 233 (upholding provisions requiring clear identi-
fication of a candidate or committee and their authorization, or lack thereof, of certain
electioneering communications); id. at 233, 246 (reversing the district court and uphold-
ing a requirement that broadcasters "keep publicly available records of politically related
broadcasting requests" as constitutional).
111. Id. at 141.
112. Id. at 138 n.40.
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limits would burden free speech "if they are so low as to 'preven[t]
candidates and political committees from amassing the resources nec-
essary for effective advocacy."' 113 This standard of less rigorous scru-
tiny "shows proper deference to Congress's ability to weigh competing
constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular exper-
tise."1 14 Under this less rigorous scrutiny standard, the Court reasoned
that the importance of avoiding corruption outweighed the burdens
imposed on the First Amendment right to free speech. 15 As the next
Part of this Comment examines, the validity of this reasoning is
weaker in the context of § 527 organizations.
B. The Corruption Argument Loses Credibility as Political Speech
Moves from the Political Parties and Candidates
Towards Independent Political Groups and
Associations
Individuals who donate money to § 527 political groups are exer-
cising two of the most basic constitutional rights: the right to freedom
of expression and the right of free political association. Both of these
rights are enshrined in the First Amendment.116 Taken together,
these rights support the belief that § 527 political groups are just ex-
tensions of the right of individuals to "band together and pool their
resources to support a common message."1 17 Buckley recognized, how-
ever, that this speech can be regulated to prevent corruption. 118 Mc-
Connell continued to recognize the importance of campaign finance
regulation in preventing both actual corruption and the appearance
113. Id. at 135 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)). If Commissioner
Mason's assertions, Mason Statement, supra note 79 and accompanying text, are accurate,
then the ability of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth to produce and run their advertise-
ment would have been severely burdened if they were unable to accumulate the contribu-
tions necessary to fund their efforts timely enough to have the desired effect. While this
argument could push potential analysis of this legislation into strict scrutiny (by regulating
the content of a political message), a strict scrutiny analysis is not in the scope of this
Comment.
114. McConnel4 540 U.S. at 137 (2003). The Court also noted that this standard of
review "provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns
about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political pro-
cess." Id.
115. Id. at 136.
116. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech, or ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . ").
117. Doff, supra note 34; see also infra note 218 and accompanying text (Justice Scalia's
quote).
118. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976); see also Doff, supra note 34.
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of corruption.11 9 As this speech becomes further separated from the
candidates and the political parties, however, this rationale loses
much of its strength.
Buckley upheld FECA's first contribution limits to avoid both the
dangers of actual corruption as well as the appearance of corruption
when the "disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election" were
fresh in their memory, demonstrating that the problem of corruption
was "not an illusory one."1 20 Buckley held that a limitation on a per-
son's contributions survived First Amendment scrutiny because it in-
volved "little direct restraint on his political communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribu-
tion but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues."1 21 McConnell noted numerous abuses
related to soft money fundraising, including the infamous White
House coffees during the Clinton Administration1 2 2 and the Republi-
can Party's major donor programs, 2 3 and the access to elected offi-
119. McConnell 540 U.S. at 136-38. Corruption in context of campaign finance reform
being "the overt or implicit exchange of legislative votes in return for campaign contribu-
tions; or, more subtly, the determination of a legislative agenda on the basis of contribu-
tions; or, in some cases, even the mere 'appearance of corruption.'" BRADLEY A. SMITH,
UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, 123 (2001).
120. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27; see, e.g., discussion supra note 89 (detailing these
examples).
121. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (noting that "transformation of contributions into political
debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor").
122. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130 & n.28. A five-volume Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Affairs report investigating possible illegal or improper activities by the Democratic
National Committee ("DNC"), the Republican National Committee ("RNC"), and others
during the 1996 election described this program:
Between January 11, 1995 and August 23, 1996, the White House hosted 103 cof-
fees. Most lasted at least an hour, and the President attended the vast majority of
them. Approximately 60 of these were DNC-sponsored coffees, 92 percent of the
guests at which were major Democratic Party contributors. These guests made
contributions during the 1996 election cycle of $26.4 million, an average contri-
bution of over $54,000 per person, with one-third of their total donations, some
$7.7 million, given within a month of the donor's attendance at a White House
coffee. For example, the five persons attending a coffee on May 1, 1996, in the
Oval Office itself each contributed $100,000 to the DNC one week later.
1 S. REP. No. 105-167, at 41 (1998).
123. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130-31 & n.30. The minority views of the Senate report
described the Republican programs:
The Republican National Committee's two principal donor programs are Team
100, which requires "an initial contribution of $100,000 upon joining, and
$25,000 in the subsequent 3 years," and the Republican Eagles, which requires
members to contribute $15,000 annually. To recruit members, the RNC's promo-
tional materials promised that participants in the Team 100 and Eagles programs
would receive special access to high-ranking Republican elected officials, includ-
ing governors, senators, and representatives.
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cials that these fund raising schemes provided the donor.124 The
Court also noted how advertisements paid for the political parties us-
ing soft money were often coordinated with, and even controlled by,
candidates' campaigns.1 25
A significant characteristic of § 527 groups is that they function
independently from candidates and political parties. Federal regula-
tions forbid coordination of expenditures between § 527 organiza-
tions and candidates or political parties-to do so would violate the
definition of an independent expenditure. 126 If § 527 groups coordi-
nate with the political parties or candidates on an advertisement, then
the cost of the advertisement is considered an in-kind contribution to
the political party1 27 or candidate 128 and cannot exceed their statutory
contribution limits. Coordination by the Bush campaign with the Swift
Boat Veterans on their advertisements would have resulted in the
Bush campaign receiving a $546,000 in kind donation-far in excess
of the limits proscribed in FECA.129
5 S. REP. No. 105-167, at 7968 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
124. McConnell 540 U.S. at 130-31 (citing 1 S. REP. No. 105-167; 2 S. REP. No. 105-167;
5 S. REP. No. 105-167); see also id. at 147 ("For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy
individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to
national committees not on ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing
influence over federal officials.").
125. Id. at 131 (citing 1 S. REP. No. 105-167).
126. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (2005). The regulation reads:
(a) The term independent expenditure means an expenditure by a person for a
communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or
their agents, or a political party committee or its agents. A communication is
"made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or sugges-
tion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or their agents, or a
political party committee or its agents" if it is a coordinated communication
under 11 CFR 109.21 or a party coordinated communication under 11 CFR
109.37.
(b) No expenditure by an authorized committee of a candidate on behalf of that
candidate shall qualify as an independent expenditure.
(c) No expenditure shall be considered independent if the person making the
expenditure allows a candidate, a candidate's authorized committee, or their
agents, or a political party committee or its agents to become materially involved
in decisions regarding the communication as described in 11 CFR 109.21 (d) (2),
or shares financial responsibility for the costs of production or dissemination with
any such person.
Id.; see also id. §§ 109.21(b), 109.37(b).
127. See id. § 109.37(b) (party coordinated communication).
128. See id. § 109.21(b) (candidate coordinated communication).
129. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2000) (contribution limits for federal candidates).
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Many pundits felt that the superior financial advantage of Demo-
cratic-leaning 527 groups would give the Democratic Party a signifi-
cant advantage in the 2004 election. 130 These pundits, however, forgot
that these groups were legally required to operate independently
from the Kerry campaign. The inability of the § 527 groups to coordi-
nate their message with the Kerry campaign clearly indicates that sig-
nificant spending, even of soft money, will not always influence the
election in the way it is intended to. The head of the Media Fund, a
Democratic-leaning 527 organization, noted in a post-election inter-
view that "the federal election law prohibiting communication with
the Kerry campaign created insurmountable obstacles in crafting ef-
fective, accurate responses to anti-Kerry ads."1 13 Even Senator Kerry's
media advisor complained that the Democratic-oriented 527 media
groups "didn't do what we wanted done."1 3 2
Candidates and parties become less accountable for political
speech as it becomes more distant from them.133 If the parties and
candidates are less accountable, then they are also less beholden to
the individuals contributing to the organizations engaging in that
speech. A candidate less beholden to individuals is also less subject to
real or perceived corruption. Restrictions on the ability of political
parties and candidates to coordinate or influence the advocacy deci-
sions of § 527 groups allows them to actually advocate independently,
further reducing the potential for corruption.
C. Independent Advocacy Presents Significantly Less Potential for
Corruption than Direct Contributions
The hallmark of § 527 organizations is issue advocacy using unco-
ordinated, independent expenditures. The potential for corruption
presented by these types of independent expenditures is appreciably
less than that presented by direct contributions.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court rejected FECA's original definition
of "expenditure" as unconstitutionally vague.' 34 Instead, the Court
adopted a narrower construction of the term expenditure to mean,
130. See, e.g., Editorial, Reversal of Campaign Fortunes, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at B02.
131. Edsall & Grimaldi, supra note 12, at A7 (paraphrasing comments by Harold Ickes,
former White House Deputy Chief of Staff in the Clinton Administration and head of the
Media Fund).
132. Id. (quoting Senator Kerry's media advisor Tad Devine).
133. Dorf, supra note 34.
134. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (interpreting the definition of expenditure
in FECA as money spent "'for the purpose of... influencing' the ... election of candidates
for federal office"). See also 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9) (A) (i) (2000).
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for FECA purposes, "only funds used for communications that ex-
pressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date. 1 3 5 This has become known as the "express advocacy" test.13
6
The express advocacy test applies when a communication includes
"the candidate's name, nickname, photograph, or drawing ... or [if]
the identity of the candidate is otherwise apparent through an unam-
biguous reference.., or through an unambiguous reference to his or
her status as a candidate .... -137 In distinguishing between express
advocacy and issue advocacy, the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Buckley that FECA could limit the amount of contributions made
directly to a candidate, but found its limits on independent expendi-
tures by persons unconnected with a candidate's campaign
unconstitutional. 138
The Court opined that the potential for corruption was high
when an individual made a large direct contribution to a candidate,
increasing the chances that the candidate, once in office, would adopt
policies advocated by that large contributor. 13 9 Conversely, the Court
felt that individuals making large independent expenditures on a candi-
date's behalf would be less likely to influence the candidate once in
office. 140
McConnell reaffirmed the special place of § 527 political groups
noting that they remained "free to raise soft money to fund voter re-
gistration, GOTV [get out the vote] activities, mailings, and broadcast
advertising (other then electioneering communications) ."141 The
Court concluded, "this disparate treatment does not offend the Con-
135. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80 (footnote omitted).
136. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986); FEC v. Christian
Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 1999).
137. 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (2004).
138. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29 ("We find that ... the weighty interests served by restricting
the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited
effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling."). Id. at
51 ("We conclude that [the] ... independent expenditure limitation is unconstitutional
under the First Amendment."); see also Storey, supra note 27, at 170.
139. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45; see also Storey, supra note 27, at 170. Section 527 organiza-
tion donors, however, are more ideologically motivated:
Ideological givers-such as George Soros on the Democratic side and the Wyly
brothers, Sam and Charles, on the Republican side-truly believe that it is in the
best interest of themselves and the country to get certain people elected. This is
opposed to a donor who believes in supporting someone who he thinks can help
him once in office, whether the candidate is a Republican or Democrat.
Larry Noble, Remarks, Campaign Finance and 527 Organizations, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 821, 823
(2004).
140. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45; see also Storey, supra note 27, at 170.
141. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 187-88 (2003).
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stitution"'1 4 2 because Congress could legitimately distinguish between
political parties and interest groups when regulating campaign
finance:
Interest groups do not select slates of candidates for elections. In-
terest groups do not determine who will serve on legislative com-
mittees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative
caucuses. Political parties have influence and power in the Legisla-
ture that vastly exceeds that of any interest group. As a result, it is
hardly surprising that party affiliation is the primary way by which
voters identify candidates, or that parties in turn have special access
to and relationships with federal officeholders. 14 3
Thus, as McConnell makes clear, because interest groups do not have
the influence that political parties possess, the potential for corrup-
tion is much less.
D. The Corruption Argument Loses Credibility as the Activity of
527 Political Groups Brings Political Speech Closer to
the People
The potential for corruption also decreases as political contribu-
tions move away from the political parties and candidates towards
§ 527 organizations and other political associations. Post-BCRA, these
associations finance and perform many of the functions previously
funded by political parties-i.e., voter registration, get out the vote,
and voter mobilization. Whereas soft money donations supported the
party operations, § 527 organizations rely on direct donations specifi-
cally raised for these types of activities.
Buckley led to the explosion of soft money in politics as groups
that were engaged solely in issue advocacy became exempt from the
1974 Act's disclosure requirements. The only regulation they were
subject to was § 527 of the IRC, which for nearly twenty-five years after
Buckley, subjected them to practically no regulation at all, while grant-
ing them the same tax-exempt status as the political organizations and
candidates registering with and reporting to the FEC. In addition, po-
litical parties and candidates were allowed to receive soft money con-
tributions until the enactment of the BCRA outlawed these soft money
contributions.1 4 4 McConnell upheld this soft money ban, invoking
Buckley's constitutional contribution limits, noting that the BCRA's
"restrictions have only a marginal impact on the ability of contribu-
tors, candidates, officeholders, and parties to engage in effective polit-
142. Id. at 188.
143. Id.
144. See discussion supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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ical speech."1 45 The BCRA also prohibited national, state, and local
party committees from soliciting funds for, or directing donations, to
§ 527 political organizations. 146 McConnell upheld this restriction as a
valid attempt to avoid circumvention of the BCRA's soft money
ban. 147 The potential for corruption noted in McConnell, when politi-
cal parties raise and collect funds on behalf of § 527 organizations, no
longer exists now that this practice is prohibited. 148
Conversely, "hard money," or direct contributions to a candidate
or political party, is subject to the strict disclosure requirements of
FECA.149 National party committees, state and local party committees,
and federal candidate committees all have to register with and report
to the FEC. Federally registered PACs (including union and corporate
PACs) that engage in federal election activity-expressly advocating
the election or defeat of a federal candidate-are also required to
register with the FEC and adhere to their disclosure requirements. By
its very nature, hard money, with its contribution limits and source
restrictions, is more difficult to raise. 150 One could argue that the
sponsors of the BCRA, via the soft money ban, hoped that this diffi-
culty would lead to less overall money in politics, thus resulting in less
spending. 15 1
145. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 138 (2003) (citing FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146, 161 (2003)). The Court noted that while the BCRA
prohibits national parties from receiving or spending nonfederal money,
and ... state party committees from spending nonfederal money on federal elec-
tion activities, neither provision in any way limits the total amount of money par-
ties can spend. Rather, they simply limit the source and individual amount of
donations. That they do so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not
render them expenditure limitations.
Id. at 139 (citation and footnote omitted). This logic sounds vaguely similar to logic used
in Buckley that limiting contributions did not restrain a person's political communications.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
146. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(d) (West 2004); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NowAK,
TREATISE ON CONsTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 20.51 (3d ed. Supp. 2005).
147. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 178; ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 146, § 20.51.
148. See McConnell 540 U.S. at 178-79.
149. See Storey, supra note 27, at 173.
150. A quick way to remember the definition of hard money is that it is "hard" to raise.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 107-131, pt. 1, at 48 (2001) ("There simply is too much special-
interest money from too few sources flowing into party committees in the form of soft
money .... Increased reliance on soft money shows no signs of abating, and is of particular
concern."); id. at 49 ("Given the vast number of uses to which political parties may legally
put soft money, and the relative ease with which they can raise soft money compared to
hard money, it is not surprising that parties have developed a significant dependence on a
handful of super-wealth soft money contributors to finance their political and administra-
tive operations.").
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The Supreme Court found in Buckley that no governmental goal
was sufficient tojustify the 1974 Act's campaign expenditure limits.1 52
According to the Court, the only government purpose FECA limits
served was reducing the "skyrocketing costs of political campaigns.' 153
In the Court's view, the government did not have "the power to deter-
mine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, exces-
sive, or unwise."1 54 The goal of reducing campaign spending, however
noble, does not justify restrictions of political speech.
Moreover, judging from the 2004 election, the BCRA may have
actually had the opposite effect financially. Parties and candidates
raised record sums of hard money, all from individuals and subject to
FECA limitations. Nevertheless, the total amount of soft money raised
and spent in the 2004 election cycle actually decreased from the 2002
election cycle,155 and that cycle did not even contain a presidential
election. The BCRA has thus resulted in more individuals getting in-
volved in the process through their direct contributions to candidates
and political parties. Consider that it now takes 200 donors contribut-
ing $100 per person in 2004 to replace a $20,000 check that one
union, corporation, or rich donor could have written in 2000, and it is
not surprising that the political parties reported an increase in the
number of small donors in 2004.156
152. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976). Among the suggested interests noted were
limiting rapidly increasing campaign costs, reducing increased candidate dependence on
large contributions, reducing the incentive to circumvent contribution limits, and equaliz-
ing the financial resources of federal candidates. See id. at 56-58.
153. Id. at 57.
154. Id. (noting that it was the "people ... and candidates ... who must retain control
over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign"). Spending
limits for presidential candidates who accept public financing, however, were upheld. See
generally id. at 85-109 (dispensing with a multitude of appellant arguments challenging the
constitutionality of Subtitle H of the Act on First and Fifth Amendment grounds).
155. Weissman & Hassan, supra note 4, at 3 (comparing Pre-BCRA party soft money in
2002 of $591 million to total Federal 527 Soft Money of $254 million in 2004-a resulting
decrease of $337 million in total soft money).
156. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., BUILDING ON REFORM: A BUSINESS PROPOSAL TO
STRENGTHEN ELECTION FINANCE 13 tbl. 1 (2005), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/re-
port/report-cfr2005.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (noting that hard money raised by the
Democrats increased from $212.9 million in 2000 to $580.7 million in 2004 while Republi-
cans saw an increase from $361.9 million in 2000 to $632.5 million in 2004). The Demo-
crats increased their direct mail small donors seven-fold from 2000 to 2004. Id. at 14. The
Republicans experienced an increase of one million new donors over 2000-and that was
only through the beginning of 2004. Id. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Com-
mittee saw the number of new donors double from the 2002 to 2004 election cycle while
the Republicans saw an increase of more than 700,000 new donors for their Senate and
Congressional Campaign Committees. Id. The first eighteen months of the 2004 election
cycle saw small donors (those contributing $200 or less) funding the national political
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While the BCRA reduced the ability of soft money to influence
candidates and parties, it also reduced the parties' ability to spend
money on voter mobilization and other federal election activities. This
left the various 527 political organizations with the responsibility of
registering and mobilizing voters sympathetic to their goals and agen-
das for the 2004 election. This added responsibility necessitated the
raising and spending of tremendous amounts of money.15 7 Thus, as a
consequence of the BCRA, § 527 organizations have assumed many of
the traditional roles that political parties and candidates held prior to
2004. In doing so, these organizations have brought millions of peo-
ple into the process that might otherwise have felt powerless in the
face of political parties thought to be beholden to soft money contrib-
utors like unions and large corporations. Democrats increased their
vote totals from 2000 to 2004 by 6.8 million, while President Bush in-
creased his vote totals from 2000 by almost 10.5 million. 158 The addi-
tion of nearly seventeen million new voters since the enactment of the
BCRA and the explosion of § 527 groups is strong evidence that the
current system is not broken.15 9
Section 527 groups can claim some credit for this increase in di-
rect political participation. Senator McCain's noble goals of resurging
grassroots activism and increased hard money contributions to the po-
litical parties160 should not be prematurely halted by limiting the abil-
ity of § 527 groups to help mobilize and turn out these newly excited
voters. Unions, corporations, and rich donors may not like it; how-
parties in the amount of $272 million-more the twice the amount they contributed for
the comparable period during the 2000 election cycle. Id.
157. See id. at 15-16.
158. Edsall & Grimaldi, supra note 12, at A7.
159. Cf H.R. REP. No. 109-181, at 55 (2005) (alleging in the Minority Views that the
House version of the 527 Reform Act "turns back [the] highest voter participation gains
over [the] last 35 years"). The minority views noted that:
H.R. 513 would restrict many 527 organizations that played a critical role in in-
creasing civic participation by registering, educating, and mobilizing millions of
voters for the 2004 November general election. Voter turnout reached unprece-
dented highs as nearly 126 million voters participated in the 2004 elections. An
estimated 15 million additional voters participated in the 2004 election over the
November 2000 election. Many were previously unregistered or disengaged, and
they have now reengaged in the political process. Congress should be encourag-
ing and supporting this kind of increase in voter participation, rather than ob-
structing it.
Id.
160. See 150 CONG. REc. S576, S577 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain)
("[B]oth the Democratic and Republican national parties are reporting a resurgence in
grassroots support and significant increases in new hard money donors."). Sen. McCain
was discussing the BCRA and the FEC's efforts to implement the legislation. Id.
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ever, it is preferable in our democracy for our elected officials to be
beholden to the ordinary voter and small donor. The activity of 527
political groups, such as American Coming Together and the Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth, is exactly the intended result of campaign
finance reform-that is, removing political parties and corporate in-
terests from the equation and bringing political speech closer to the
people. 61
E. Disclosure Requirements for Section 527 Political Groups Are
Nearly Identical to Those Required by FEC-Regulated
Political Committees
Commissioner Mason testified that "[t]oday the activities of the
527 organizations at issue are almost wholly transparent: they register
with the government and disclose their funding, spending, and key
organizational features.' 1 62 This has not always been the case. Disclo-
sure requirements were first imposed on political committees and can-
didates with the 1974 FECA amendments. Buckley upheld these
disclosure requirements. Even applying the strict scrutiny required in
First Amendment cases, the Court held that the "governmental inter-
ests sought to be vindicated by the disclosure requirements... [were]
of... [substantial] magnitude" 163 and identified three categories of
those interests. First, the disclosure rules assisted voters in evaluating
candidates seeking federal office by providing them with details on
where a candidate's funds came from and how they were spent. 164 Sec-
ond, these requirements deterred "actual corruption" and avoided the
"appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and ex-
penditures to the light of publicity.' 1 65 Finally, Buckley found that the
161. See generally H.R. REP. No. 107-131 (Part I), at 48-52 (2001), as reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 120-24.
162. Mason Statement, supra note 79, at 6. Commissioner Mason worried that regula-
tion of 527 organizations would migrate a significant amount of money from 527 organiza-
tions to 501(c) organizations that are not subject to disclosure requirements. Id.; see also
discussion supra note 25.
163. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (acknowledging "that there are govern-
mental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement [on the
exercise of First Amendment rights], particularly when the 'free functioning of our na-
tional institutions' is involved" (internal citation omitted)).
164. Id. at 66-67 (stating disclosure "allows voters to place each candidate in the politi-
cal spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and
campaign speeches").
165. Id. at 67 (recalling Justice Brandeis's advice: "Publicity is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman." (internal citation omitted)). But see RoSEN-
It ANz, supra note 68, at 27 (arguing that "a candidate's unlimited demand for
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"recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements... [were] an
essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations
of ... contribution limitations."1 66
FECA's disclosure rules, while upheld in Buckley, were signifi-
cantly narrowed in scope. Buckley construed "expenditures" for the
purpose of disclosure the same way it construed "expenditures" for
the purpose of advocacy. 167 Thus, disclosure of expenditures was only
required for "spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign
of a particular federal candidate. ' 168 Disclosure for individuals and
non-candidate groups or PACs was only required for "contributions
earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a can-
didate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political
committee, and . .. expenditures for communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."
169
After nearly a quarter of a century of political organizations oper-
ating under § 527 with "limited public scrutiny,"1 70 Congress finally
adopted disclosure requirements for tax-exempt political organiza-
tions.171 In addition to requiring political organizations to register
with the Secretary of the Treasury,' 72 legislation enacted in 2000 im-
money . . . exposes the candidate to mounting dangers of corruption with each
solicitation").
166. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68.
167. Id. at 80.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003).
171. Id. The impetus to this new requirement may well have been an issue advertise-
ment aired by the spurious "Republicans for Clean Air" against Senator McCain days
before the South Carolina primary in his race for the 2000 Republican nomination for
President. The advertisement stated:
Last year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy. That means
more use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air. Ohio Republicans care
about clean air. So does Governor Bush. He led one of the first states in America
to clamp down on old coal-burning electric power plants. Bush's clean air laws
will reduce air pollution more than a quarter million tons a year. That's like tak-
ing [five] million cars off the road. Governor Bush, leading so each day dawns
brighter.
Holman, supra note 25, at 247 (citing CRAIG HOLMAN & LUKE McLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME
2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 25 (2001)). The public as-
sumed that the advertisement was produced by a pro-environment group, however, as an
issue advertisement, no disclosure with either the IRS or the FEC was required. Id. Only
later did the public learn that the advertisement was paid for by two individuals-Texas
billionaires Charles and Sam Wyly, long-time contributors to and friends of George Bush.
Id. at 247-48.
172. I.R.C. § 527(i) (2000).
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posed limited disclosure requirements for contributions and expendi-
tures.1 73 Organizations were now required to disclose the "name and
address . . . of all contributors which contributed an aggregate
amount of $200 or more to the organization during the calendar year
and the amount... of the contribution.1 74 For disbursements, disclo-
sure of "the amount... of each expenditure made to a person if the
aggregate amount of expenditures to such person during the calendar
year equals or exceeds $500 and the name and address of the person"
was required. 175 Failure to make the required disclosures results in the
organization "pay[ing] the highest corporate tax rate on 'the amount
to which the failure relates.' 176 This rule applies to both contribu-
tions and disbursements-subjecting the non-disclosing organization
to tax on "the amount of money coming in as well as the amount of
money going out."177 While an organization can refuse to disclose in-
formation about contributions and expenditures, the financial incen-
tive to comply is substantial.1 78
A United States district court in Alabama found § 527(j) of the
IRC unconstitutional for precisely this reason. 179 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed this decision on ap-
peal in Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States.180 The Eleventh
Circuit court held the "section 527(j) form[ed] part of the overall tax
scheme" 181 and noted that if a "political organization [was] uncom-
fortable with the disclosure of expenditures or contributions[, it] may
173. See Pub. L. No. 106-230, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 477 (amending I.R.C.
§ 527, adding sections 527(i) and 527(j)).
174. I.R.C. § 527 0) (3) (B) (2000) (amended 2002, 2003) (requiring additional disclo-
sure of the occupation and name of employer for individuals who make contributions).
Compare with I.R.C. § 527(j) (3) (B) (West 2004) (including the requirement for the date
and purpose of the expenditure added by the 2002 amendment).
175. I.R.C. § 527(j) (3) (A) (2000) (amended 2002, 2003) (requiring additional disclo-
sure of the occupation and name of employer for individuals receiving expenditures); see
also Pub. L. No. 106-230, 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 477. Compare with I.R.C.
§ 527(j) (3) (A) (West 2004) (including the requirement for the date and purpose of the
expenditure added by the 2002 amendment).
176. Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003) (citing I.R.C. § 527(j)(1) (2000)).
177. Id. at 1361.
178. The highest corporate tax rate in effect for tax year 2005 is 39%. See I.R.C.
§ II(b)(1) (West 2005).
179. See Nat'l Fed'n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1273,
1286 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (concluding that "subsection (j) of [the code] ... was a penalty
rather than a tax"). Id.
180. 353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003).
181. Id. at 1361.
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simply decline to register under section 527(i) and avoid these re-
quirements altogether." 182
Following the initial finding that § 527() was unconstitutional,
Congress amended it.183 The amendment required disclosure of the
date and purpose of expenditures as well as the date for contribu-
tions. 184 Generally, § 527 political groups are required to file disclo-
sure forms quarterly 85 during an election year and semi-annually 86
in non-federal election years. Additionally, during election years, an
organization must file a twenty-day pre-election report 87 and a thirty-
day post-election report. l88 An organization can also elect to file their
disclosure reports on a monthly basis.' 89 These disclosure forms fol-
low a similar schedule as those filed by political committees regulated
by the FEC.' 90 Since the 2002 amendment, § 527 organizations dis-
close to the IRS the same contribution information, on a nearly identi-
cal schedule, that political organizations regulated by the FECA
disclose to the FEC.
The risk of corrupting candidates and political parties was miti-
gated by the disclosure regime implemented by the 1974 FECA
amendments. Today § 527 organizations operate under disclosure re-
quirements nearly identical to those of political action committees;
their contributions and expenditures exposed to the same light of
publicity. While preventing corruption may be a legitimate govern-
ment interest, bringing § 527 organizations under FEC control makes
it a moot issue as this would expose no more or no less corruption
than the current disclosure system exposes today. Both political com-
mittees and § 527 organizations operate equally transparently-the
only difference being the government agency that collects their disclo-
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1360 n.2; see also Pub. L. No. 107-276, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 1929.
184. See I.R.C. § 527 0) (3) (2004). The amendments to section 527 exempted from the
disclosure requirements "organizations focused solely on state and local elections and sub-
ject to comparable requirements under state law." Mobile Republican Assembly, 353 F.3d at
1360 n.2 (citing to Pub. L. No. 107-276, § 2, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 1929).
185. I.R.C. § 527(j) (2) (A) (i) (I) (West 2004).
186. Id. § 527(j) (2) (A) (ii).
187. Id. § 527(j) (2) (A) (i) (II) (covering information through the twelfth day prior to
the election and due no later than the twelfth day prior to the election).
188. Id. § 527(j) (2) (A) (i) (III) (covering information through the twentieth day after
the election and due no later than the thirtieth day after the election).
189. Id. §527(j)(2)(B).
190. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (2000) (detailing the filing period coverage and due
dates for the various committee types covered by the FECA).
[Vol. 40
sure data. 191 The fear of corruption is also diminished by the fact that
donor and expenditure information is available in the public
domain. 192
F. The Ineffective Solution: "The 527 Reform Act"
The 2004 Presidential campaign may long be remembered for
the role that § 527 organizations played. Democratic-leaning § 527 or-
ganizations produced political advertisements critical of President
Bush long before the Democratic nominee was known. 193 These ad-
vertisements were perfectly legal and did not raise corruption con-
cerns, since they did not advocate the election of an individual
candidate for President. 194 The so-called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth
organization produced political advertisements raising questions
about Senator Kerry's Vietnam War experience that were similarly le-
gal, albeit questionably factual, since they too did not advocate the
election of an individual candidate for President. 95 These swift boat
advertisements generated the most controversy, primarily due to the
inability to prove or disprove the allegations they contained.196
The swift boat advertisements cost $546,000-a paltry sum by
campaign spending standards.1 97 The 527 Reform Act will not prevent
fifty people from donating $25,000 each to a § 527 organization to
191. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2000) (outlining the reporting requirements for political com-
mittees); I.R.C. § 527(j) (2000) (describing the IRS filing requirements).
192. The IRS maintains an on-line political organization filing and disclosure database.
See Internal Revenue Serv., Political Organization Filing and Disclosure, http://
www.irs.gov/charities/political/article/0,,id=109644,00.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
193. For example, the MoveOn.org Voter fund aired an advertisement critical of Presi-
dent Bush's Medicare plan on CNN and other networks in early 2004. See Press Release,
MoveOn.org Voter Fund, MoveOn.org Voter Fund Calls for Justice Dept. Investigation of
Administration's Illegal Use of Government Funds For Bush "Re-Election Ads" (Feb. 26,
2004), available at http://www.moveonvoterfund.org/cbsrelease.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2005) (noting that CBS refused to air the advertisement during the 2004 Super Bowl). The
group also spent $500,000 airing an advertisement in June 2004 featuring a worker who
'goes from good benefits to flipping burgers" in Ohio, a state the organization claimed lost
270,000 jobs during the Bush Administration. Press Release, MoveOn.org Voter Fund,
MoveOn Voter Fund Launches $500,000 Ad Campaign in Ohio (June 24, 2004), available
at http://www.moveonvoterfund.org/flippingburgers/pressrelease.pdf (last visited Sept.
19, 2005). The Media Fund spent $10 million on television advertisements by early April
2004-nearly four months prior to the nominating conventions. Dan Fost, Liberals in Or-
ganizing Frenzy to Prove Left Is Right, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2004, at A6.
194. See supra Part I.B.
195. See generally Dobbs, supra note 2, at A18 (noting "significant flaws and factual er-
rors" in both Senator Kerry's and the Swift Boat Veterans' accounts of the Bay Hap River
incident while attempting to reconstruct the events of that day).
196. Id.
197. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (cost of advertisement).
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produce a similar advertisement in the future. The contribution limi-
tation, however, may have prevented the production of one of the pos-
itive issue advocacy advertisements of the 2004 campaign. The
Republican-oriented 527 group, Progress for America, spent $17 mil-
lion recounting "Ashley's story"-the story of Bush's meeting with an
eleven-year-old girl whose mother died in the September 1 1th attack
on the World Trade Center.198
The 527 Reform Act will not prevent a similar advertisement in
the future from raising issues that have a dramatic impact on a candi-
date's campaign. The simple truth of the swift boat advertisement con-
troversy is that the issues raised by it were primarily political, and no
new law should prevent the swift boat-type issue advocacy from being
raised in the future.
IV. Fighting Speech with More Political Speech
The swift boat advertisements drew a strong rebuke from Senator
McCain, leading to his introduction of the 527 Reform Act of 2004199
less than two months after the advertisements first aired in battle-
ground states across the country.200 Senator McCain's approach, to
regulate § 527 political groups like any other political committee, is
one approach to the issue. Proponents of increased regulation feel
that their approach is the best way to reduce irresponsible advertise-
ments. 20 ' A final evaluation of the effectiveness of Swift Boat Veterans'
advertisement, however, belongs in a political context, not in a regula-
tory one. Treating the organization like other federally registered po-
litical action committees would not have diminished its effectiveness.
It was Senator Kerry's response to the charges raised in the advertise-
198. Edsall & Grimaldi, supra note 12, at A7.
199. See 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 2828, 108th Cong. (2004).
200. The first swift boat media buy was on August 4, 2004. See Mason Statement, supra
note 79, at 1. Senator McCain introduced the 527 Reform Act of 2004 on September 22,
2004. 150 CONG. REc. S9527 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain) (intro-
ducing the 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 2828, 108th Cong. (2004)).
201. While introducing S. 2828, Senator McCain complained:
[S]ome organizations, registered under section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code, have had a major impact on this year's presidential election by raising and
spending illegal soft money to run ads attacking both President Bush and Senator
Kerry. The use of soft money to finance these activities is clearly illegal under
current statute, and the fact that they have been allowed to continue unchecked
is unconscionable.
150 CONG. REc. S9527 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain) (introducing
the 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 2828, 108th Cong. (2004)). One can infer that Senator




ment, or the lack thereof, combined with the tremendous amount of
free replays of the advertisement on mainstream news programs, ex-
posure that only increased with Senator Kerry's silence, that damaged
the Senator's campaign. 20 2 After so much exposure, no amount of dis-
closure, spending allocation, or contribution limits would have pre-
vented the damage-only more political speech could have stopped
the bleeding. The best way to fight any abuses of the system, therefore,
is with more political speech, not additional regulation.
Rather than run to the courts or the FEC when angry about the
lies being spread by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth or when distressed
by the allegations by MoveOn.org20 3 or Fahrenheit 9/11,204 a more ef-
fective approach to counter or correct propaganda is to take Professor
Michael Dorf's advice and create a new § 527 organization.20 5 As far-
202. See, e.g., Edsall & Grimaldi, supra note 12, at A7 (noting that the first Swift Boat
advertisement "was exceptionally cost-effective: most voters learned about it through free
coverage in mainstream media and talk radio").
203. MoveOn.org is actually a federally-registered PAC, not a 527 organization operat-
ing outside of FECA. See MoveOn.org: Democracy in Action, http://www.moveon.org/
about.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2005). The organization also operates a 501 (c) (4) organi-
zation called MoveOn.org Civic Action. Id. MoveOn.org did operate a 527 organization,
the MoveOn.org Voter Fund, during the 2004 election cycle. See MoveOn.org Voter Fund,
Home Page, http://www.moveonvoterfund.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2005) (stating that
the organization "primarily runs ads exposing President Bush's failed policies in key 'bat-
tleground' states").
204. FAHRENHEIT 9/11 (Dog Eat Dog Films 2004).
205. Dorf, supra note 34 (remembering Justice Brandeis's memorable remark that "the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones") (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Commissioner Mason commented on the con-
tent of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth advertisement:
I know that the Swift Boat group and its ads were controversial, but their message
appeared to be salient with a significant portion of the public, and any preference
to mute a group because of distaste for its message, or its popularity or lack
thereof, is not a valid reason for government regulation. Indeed it is the unpopu-
lar and politically objectionable speech that needs constitutional protection.
Mason Statement, supra note 79, at 5; cf Doe v. Cahill, No. 266, 2005, 2005 WL 2455266
(Del. Oct. 5, 2005). In a libel action against four anonymous defendants for statements
posted on an internet weblog, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested an alternative form
of extrajudicial relief:
Besides the legal remedies available to a plaintiff wronged by internet defama-
tion, the potential plaintiff has available a very powerful form of extrajudicial re-
lief. The internet provides a means of communication where a person wronged
by statements of an anonymous poster can respond instantly, can respond to the
allegedly defamatory statements on the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost
contemporaneously, respond to the same audience that initially read the alleg-
edly defamatory statements. The plaintiff can thereby easily correct any misstate-
ments or falsehoods, respond to character attacks, and generally set the record
straight. This unique feature of internet communications allows a potential plain-
tiff ready access to mitigate the harm, if any, he has suffered to his reputation as a
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fetched as this idea may seem, it actually happened during the 2004
election cycle-both on large and small scales.
A group of neighbors on a Minneapolis, Minnesota block, in-
censed at the falsehoods promulgated by the Swift Boat Veterans
group, formed their own § 527 political group called Ge-
orgeTheMenace.org. 20 6 The group initially formed to saturate their
neighborhood with Kerry lawn signs, but ended up launching a web-
site and creating a thirty-second advertisement. 20 7 One member of the
group, while noting how the rules could be abused, observed: "if you
can make an argument for 527s, it would be for small groups like
us."
2 0 8
Within a few weeks after the Swift Boat Veterans started their ad-
vertising campaign, the 527 group Texans for Truth registered with
the IRS. 209 This group raised $350,000 in the first ten days of its exis-
tence and unveiled a television advertisement critical of President
Bush's service record with the Alabama National Guard. 210
Another group formed in Wisconsin and called themselves Foot-
ball Fans for Truth. 21 1 Their purpose was to inform voters of alleged
football-related misstatements by Senator Kerry, such as referring to
Green Bay's Lambeau Field as "Lambert Field" and referring to the
archrival Ohio State Buckeyes while campaigning in Michigan. 212
These are just some examples of the strength of the marketplace
of ideas. Whether or not Football Fans for Truth, Swift Boat Veterans
for Truth, Texans for Truth, MoveOn.org, Progress for America Voter
Fund, or GeorgeTheMenace.org influence voters, the right of individ-
result of an anonymous defendant's allegedly defamatory statements made on an
internet blog or in a chat room.
Id. at *10.
206. John McCormick, With a 527, Little Guys Can Behave Just Like Big Spenders; Fed-Up
Neighbors Make Anti-Bush Ad, CHI. TRm., Oct. 18, 2004, at 15.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Howard Witt &John McCormick, Agile '527' Groups Lead Well-Funded Hit-Run War,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2004, at 1.
210. Id.
211. Tom Clementi, TV Campaigning Leaves Us Tuned Out, PosT-CREscETr (Appleton,
Wis.), Sept. 26, 2004, at 12C, available at LEXIS Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers;
David R. Guarino, Web Site Founder Fields Kerry's Sports Gaffes, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 21,
2004, at 7, available at 2004 WLNR 1130429; see also Dane Smith, The Sport of Politics: Who's
Got Game?, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 28, 2004, at IA, available at 2004 WLNR
17488818 (noting that while "no corresponding 527 appears to have been formed for
Kerry ... there is a satirical Cheerleaders for Truth Web site, which claims to be mobilizing
'faith-based pompoms for George Dubya Bush'").
212. Clementi, supra note 211, at 12C.
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uals to collectively form political committees like them is rooted
deeply in the First Amendment as is their sacred right to "retain con-
trol over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in political
campaigns." 2 1
3
Justice Scalia warned in his McConnell opinion that "a law limiting
the amount a person can spend to broadcast his political views is a
direct restriction on speech." 2 14 He views legislation targeting the
money used to fund speech as a direct attack on such speech, drawing
an analogy to targeting "the paper on which a book is printed or the
trucks that deliver it to the bookstore." 215 Justice Scalia, incredulous
that a Court that protected "virtual child pornography," "tobacco ad-
vertising," "sexually explicit cable programming," and the "dissemina-
tion of illegally intercepted communications" could not find a law
protecting "the right to criticize the government" constitutional.21 6
He also noted that included in the umbrella of freedom of speech is
the "freedom to associate with others for the dissemination of ideas-
not just by singing or speaking in unison, but by pooling financial
resources for expressive purposes. ... 217
Justice Scalia felt that the BCRA infringed on speech deserving of
First Amendment protection. This does not bode well for a potential
constitutional challenge to regulations like the 527 Reform of Act of
2005. Here, the risk of corruption argument is even less powerful than
it was with the BCRA. If an originalist like Justice Scalia felt the
BCRA's corruption argument was not compelling enough to restrict
First Amendment speech protections, it is not likely that he and other
similar minded Justices would find the less powerful argument sur-
rounding the 527 Reform Act compelling enough to uphold it.218 Per-
213. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
214. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 254 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
215. Id. at 252.
216. Id. at 248 ("This is a sad day for the freedom of speech."). See generally Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (virtual child pornography); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (tobacco advertising); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (illegally intercepted communications); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc. 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (sexually explicit cable programming).
217. McConnell 540 U.S. at 255.
218. Professor Chemerinsky notes that while an originalist, Justice Scalia defines
originalism differently than the traditional definition of following "the literal text and the
specific intent of [the Constitution's] ... drafters." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83 § 1.4 at 19.
Professor Chemerinsky notes that:
Justice Antonin Scalia ... focuses on finding the "original meaning" of constitu-
tional provisions. Justice Scalia says that original meaning is to be found in the
historical practices and understandings of the time, not the views of the docu-
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haps the strongest hint of Justice Scalia's potential opinion on a
challenge to this legislation is his point that "it is not the proper role
of those who govern us to judge which campaign speech has 'sub-
stance' and 'depth' . . . and to abridge the rest."2 19
The Supreme Court in Buckley reaffirmed the First Amendment
principle that the political debate must be controlled not by the gov-
ernment, but by "the people-individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political committees .... "220 Sec-
tion 527 organizations epitomize the right of citizens to form associa-
tions, pool their resources, and advocate their political beliefs. Any
abuses or disagreements with any of these beliefs need to be counter-
acted with more political speech, not with regulation that limits politi-
cal speech. Perhaps Justice Brandeis said it best: "without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile . . . with them, discussion af-
fords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of nox-
ious doctrine . "..."221 If one believes the swift boat advertisements
were noxious doctrine, then more speech, not more regulation, pro-
vides the best protection against the dissemination of the advertise-
ments' ideas.
Conclusion
The activity of § 527 political groups is exactly the intended result
of campaign finance reform-removing parties and corporate inter-
ests from the equation and bringing political speech closer to the peo-
ple. Furthermore, the best way to fight abuses of the system is with
more speech, not additional regulation. Political organizations
formed by individual citizens lie at the nexus of the two most basic
liberties afforded citizens of the United States: the freedom of speech
and the freedom of free association. Congress has succeeded in limit-
ing the amount of contributions individuals can make to political can-
didates and eliminating direct soft money contributions to candidates
ment's drafters. As with other forms of originalism, Justice Scalia believes the
Constitution's meaning is fixed and unchanging.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Section 527 organizations, soft money, and political action com-
mittees did not exist when the First Amendment was ratified, yet Justice Scalia found the
BCRA's restrictions on political campaign financing to be a violation of the First Amend-
ment. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
219. McConnell 540 U.S. at 261.
220. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
221. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
CHEMERINSKV, supra note 83, § 11.1.2 at 895-96.
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and national parties-efforts historically blessed by the judiciary in
Buckley and McConnell.
As soft money has moved away from the candidates and parties
into tax-exempt § 527 groups, the primary impetus for campaign fi-
nance reform, corruption, or even the appearance of corruption, has
dissipated. Groups of citizens banding together to produce a political
message or mobilize voters to support a candidate who agrees with
them on a particular issue involves no overt or explicit exchange of
votes in exchange for political contributions. These groups are sup-
porting the candidate because of their view on an issue, not to influ-
ence that view.
New legislation proposed to regulate § 527 political groups as po-
litical organizations, impose contributions limits on their donors, and
subject them to soft money restrictions will not prevent groups like
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth from airing advertisements of questiona-
ble accuracy or content. The proper response to irresponsible or ideo-
logically offensive advertisements is more political speech, not
additional regulation. In the spirit of this country's heritage, the polit-
ical issues of the country must be decided on the political battlefields,
including the nation's airwaves, not in a bureaucrat's office or
courtroom.
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